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For the architecture theorist Charles Jencks, Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim
Museum in Bilbao, Peter Eisenman’s Aronoff Center in Cincinnati, and Daniel
Libeskind’s Jewish Museum in Berlin are architectural replies to the question of
the cultural outgrowths of ‘complexity science’. In the light of new technologies
being used in architecture, it seems necessary to explore Jencks’s position from
new perspectives and to ask: in the context of architectural production, is it
possible to discuss complexity not only as an artistic-aesthetic category, but also
as a fundamental technical-constructive idea? Contemporary information tech-
nologies confront architectural-theoretical discourses with developments that
call for an expanded theoretical instrumentarium. It remains unclear which
architectural language might be used best to approach the concept of complexity
associated with information technologies.
‘The complexity of architecture begins with the impossibility of questioning the
nature of space and at the same time making or experiencing a real space. [y]
We cannot both experience and think that we experience,’ explains Bernard
Tschumi in an interview for the Journal of Philosophy and the Visual Arts.1
To the question: ‘What would be the foundations of a complex architecture?’ he
replies: ‘Architecture ﬁnds itself in a unique situation: it is the only discipline
that, by deﬁnition, combines concept and experience, image and use, image and
structure. Philosophers can write, mathematicians can develop virtual spaces, but
architects are the only ones who are the prisoners of that hybrid art, where the
image hardly ever exists without combined activity.’2 Upon closer examination
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of the concept of complexity, it soon becomes evident that it has always existed
in more than one deﬁnition, more than one interpretation, and certainly more than
one architectural variant. One can either agree with Tschumi’s discussions of
complexity or approach them critically. What seems essential to us in this context
is his concluding thoughts: ‘Architecture is not about conditions of design, but
about the design of conditions [y].’3 Here, it becomes evident that reﬂections on
the concept of complexity and architecture must eventually go beyond simple
terminological deﬁnitions. Perhaps even more than other cultural disciplines,
architecture is confronted by the most diverse levels of contemporary complexity.
Against this background, it is apparently often a question of modelling further
levels of complexity, and therefore always of contriving a subsequent world
picture, rather than of precisely categorizing or analyzing the existent. What is
required are ways of reading complexity that – despite or even precisely because
of their differences – lead unavoidably to questions of the respective systems of
reference: which context generates which concept of complexity, and what
concept of complexity produces what context?
‘With clouds replacing clocks,’ conjectured American architect and archi-
tectural theoretician Charles Jencks in his Architecture of the Jumping Universe,
‘a revolution in thinking was under way, that can best be understood by opposing
it into the dominant world view, by contrasting the Postmodern sciences of
complexity with the Modern sciences of simplicity.’4 ‘In the new sciences and
architectures the fundamental idea relates to feedback, self-organizing change,
which the computer is well-adapted to portray.’5 Jencks presented complexity
research as a ‘new science’ and a ‘new paradigm.’6
For Jencks, Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Peter Eisenman’s
Aronoff Center in Cincinnati, and Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish Museum in Berlin
are architectural replies to the question of the cultural outgrowths of this new
science. More than a decade later, and in light of the new technologies being used
in architecture, it seems necessary to explore from new perspectives not so much
Jencks’s answers, but rather his questions. In the context of architectural pro-
duction, is it possible to discuss complexity not only as an artistic-aesthetic
category, but also as a fundamental technical-constructive idea? In other words:
can the epochal publication of Robert Venturi’s Complexity and Contradiction7
be regarded as a development of the concept of complexity in architecture?
The metaphor of the cloud – which achieved prominence not long ago through
the pavilion constructed by American architects Elisabeth Diller and Ricardo
Scoﬁdio at the Swiss regional exhibition Expo 02 – has surfaced repeatedly in
architectural history (Figure 1). Yet Jencks does not invoke this metaphor in the
form in which it is found in architecture, that is to say, as a poetic counter-
concept to the materiality of built architecture, or as a dream image of a space
that has been liberated from physical limitations. Jencks’s level of reference is
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instead linked to overarching questions such as those concerning the inter-
relationships between architecture, science, and metaphor, and between archi-
tecture, science, and the world picture. Does a new science generate not only new
metaphors and a new world picture, but also new architectural design strategies
as well? The interrelationships between metaphor, philosophy, and the history of
science, for example in the context of epochal upheavals and the emergence of
technical-scientiﬁc metaphors, has been the object of numerous philosophico-
historical discourses.8 Yet if ‘every creative history [has] its world picture, and
indeed in such a way as to concern itself from time to time about that world
picture,’9 than the question is: what world picture can be represented by a cloud
(in contradistinction to the mechanism of the clock)?
In searching for the source of Jencks’s metaphorical simile, the trail leads
directly to the mid-20th-century discursive space of theories of science: ‘My
clouds are intended to represent physical systems which, like gases, are highly
irregular, disorderly, and more or less unpredictable,’10 explained philosopher of
science Karl Popper matter-of-factly in April 1965 in his Arthur Holly Compton
Memorial Lecture at Washington University, continuing, ‘[y] There are lots of
things, natural processes and natural phenomena, which we may place between
these two extremes – the clouds on the left, and the clocks on the right.’11 While
Popper’s lecture dealt mainly with socio-philosophical questions, he was concerned
Figure 1. Diller1Scoﬁdio Architects: Blur building, Yverdon-les-Bains, realized
for the Swiss National Exhibition Expo. 02
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in this context with the familiar philosophical question of the degree to which
physical determinism or non-determinism supplied adequate descriptions of
reality. The title of this lecture, ‘On Clocks and Clouds,’ supplied the relevant
metaphorical dualism.
On the basis of a simple example drawn from nature, Popper further elaborated
his thoughts on the cloud metaphor. Only at second glance does it become evident
that by choosing this example, he anticipated something that could eventually be
modelled with the technical assistance of computers only 20 years later:
As a typical and interesting example of a cloud I shall make some use here of a
cloud or cluster of small ﬂies and gnats. [y] In this case of the gnats, their
keeping together can be easily explained if we assume that, although they ﬂy
quite irregularly in all directions, those that ﬁnd that they are getting away from
the crowd turn back towards that part which is densest. This assumption
explains how the cluster keeps together even though it has no leader, and no
structure – only a random statistical distribution resulting from the fact that each
gnat does exactly what he likes, in a lawless or random manner, together with
the fact that he does not like to stray too far from his comrades [y] Like many
physical, biological, and social systems, the cluster of gnats may be described as
a ‘whole.’ Yet the cluster of gnats is an example of a whole that is indeed
nothing but the sum of its parts; [y] for not only is it completely described by
describing the movements of all individual gnats, but the movement of the
whole is, in this case, precisely the (vectoral) sum of the movements of its
constituent members, divided by the number of members.12
In light of the following discussion of the concept of complexity and its develop-
ment, Popper’s lecture offers two concrete points of departure: ﬁrst, he speaks of
the possible description of the swarm as a ‘whole,’ an entity that is more than the
‘sum of its parts.’ At the same time, through his attempt to explain the enigmatic
coherence of the swarm ‘without a leader,’ he also supplies us with a structural
reference for the technical modelling of the behaviour of dynamic systems. An
initial reading suggests the immediate adoption of a manner of expression drawn
from the ﬁeld of Gestalt psychology. The investigations of this theory of percep-
tion, which emerged in Germany in the early twentieth century, were driven by the
central question of the perception of complex phenomena or stimuli.13
A second reading, on the other hand, reveals the outlines of something that
would presumably be characterized (from the perspective of contemporary
technology) by American computer scientist Mitchel Resnick as ‘decentralized
systems and self-organized behaviors’:14 a self-organizing, complex system
consisting of multiplicity of interacting elements (Figure 2).15
Popper’s mention of principles drawn from theories of perception is no
accident; as early as 1928, his philosophically oriented dissertation Zur Metho-
denfrage der Denkpsychologie (On Questions of Method in the Psychology of
Thinking) was supervised by Karl Bu¨hler.16 Bu¨hler, a German psychologist of
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thinking and perception, was a decisive inﬂuence for many of Popper’s socio-
philosophical views. Popper’s remark that despite the nonlinear movements of
each individual mosquito, the swarm as a whole functions like a coordinated
collective is an allusion to the reciprocal effects in complex systems between
local behaviours and global outcomes: technically, the global behaviour of a
system can be modelled on the basis of local knowledge provided there exists
a sufﬁciently large number of interacting elements. In Die Logik der Sozial-
wissenschaft (The Logic of the Social Sciences),17 Popper presented a series of
theses designed to ‘articulate the opposition between our knowledge and our
non-knowledge.’18 Here, we encounter the term ‘situational logic,’ coined by
Popper, and so reminiscent of the general term ‘situated agent,’ which would
become paradigmatic in so-called ‘new artiﬁcial intelligence.’ Both concepts
Figure 2. ‘‘Boids’’ model by Craig Reynolds in collaboration with the Symbolics
Graphics Division and Whitney/Demos Production, 1986/87. r Craig Reynolds
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emphasize the coupling between the agent and the context in which the agent
acts: whether as here in the framework of a situational analysis, or as a cognitive
modelling rule for the technical implementation of a multi-agent system.19 The
agent is inseparable from the context in which it is situatively embedded.
Situatedness, then, is a fundamental condition permitting the modelling of global
complexity through a simple system of local rules.
Popper’s Holly Compton Memorial Lecture was published in 1966. Also pub-
lished that year was Venturi’s Complexity and Contradiction. For decades, Venturi’s
concept of complexity would remain central to the discourse concerning the
opposition between narratives of complexity in postmodernist architecture and
productive clarity in modernist architecture. Only relatively late would ideas con-
cerning complex systems be brought into relationship with postmodernist ideas
of complexity, for instance by Jencks, Wolfgang Welsch or Klaus Mainzer.20 To be
sure, Postmodernism had honed an aesthetic gaze for nonlinear processes. An
awareness of the dynamics of complex systems in nature, however, could be
generated only through the technical clarity of computer simulation. Contributing to
this development were personalities such as Claude Shannon, John von Neumann,
and Herbert Simon. The question of whether to credit the emergence of theories of
chaos and complexity in the history of science with a qualitative transformation of
the world picture will surely receive further discussion. Also meriting continuing
philosophical-scientiﬁc debate is the question of the degree to which humankind has
– in opposition to the sciences in modernity – come closer to nature. Is it the case
that ‘all that we can infer about the nature of the world from the fact that we have to
use mathematical language if we want to describe it, is that this world has a certain
degree of complexity or, that there are certain relationships in this world that cannot
be described with too primitive means?’21
Against the background of the concept of complexity, cybernetics has conjured up
a structural-scientiﬁc foundation of which the technological potential and cultural
magnitude for architectural production can be discussed only from the perspective of
contemporary information technology. ‘The thought of every age is reﬂected in its
technique,’ observed American mathematician Norbert Wiener in his Cybernetics.22
Wiener’s book has fostered the ‘techniﬁcation’ of concepts in the humanities, natural
sciences, and arts. This has had consequences for architecture as well. Through
processes of ‘metaphoricization’, such cybernetically minted concepts as ‘commu-
nication’ and ‘feedback’ advanced to the status of productive and effective guiding
ideas in the architecture of succeeding decades. Abstract control processes now stood
in the foreground, having supplanted individual features, and much inﬂuenced by a
future universal science that would, it was said, integrate the various disciplines.
Relegated to a secondary status was the question of whether we are talking about
biological organisms, technical processes of automation, human perceptions, con-
cepts of architectural engineering, or architectural planning and design processes.
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In short, it was a question of the ‘ontological restlessness’ referred to by German
media theoretician Claus Pias in his essay on the utopian potential of cyber-
netics.23 ‘This restlessness,’ writes Pias, ‘resides in the indistinctness or inter-
changeability of that which was previously distinguished from artifacts under the
concept of the human.’24
In discussions of architecture and complexity, the cybernetic period is accorded
an important role. The appearance of Complexity and Contradiction coincided with
Time Magazine’s heralding of the ‘Cybernated Generation’ in April 1965.25
Coinciding with Venturi’s manifesto was a concept of complexity that could be
discussed in the context of a ‘general, formal science of the structure, relations, and
behavior of dynamic systems.’26 Complexity, then, could be understood from the
perspectives of broadcast technology and information theory.27
Just one year after Venturi’s publication, Gyo¨rgy Kepes, a Hungarian-Amer-
ican artist and theoretician of art, announced the emergence of an integrated
structural order encompassing the arts, architecture, science, and technology,
which would interconnect the disciplines. Occurring in the present, according to
Kepes, was a movement from the ‘classical sciences of simplicity toward a
modern science of ordered complexity.’28 Against this background, he juxtaposes
Pier Luigi Nervi’s supporting frame constructions, Buckminster Fuller’s spatial
frameworks, and Max Bill’s concrete painting with electron-microscope images and
X-ray images of crystals, cells, and ﬂuids. Just as he had done a year earlier in his
New Landscape in Art and Science,29 Kepes presents his arguments through a
rhetoric of visual analogies, announcing in this connection that ‘the most powerful
imaginative vision is structure oriented.’30 Despite the fact that concepts such as
nonlinearity and self-organization are accorded no explicit signiﬁcance in Kepes’
structural aesthetics, they are a fundamental condition in terms of Gestalt psy-
chology for attempts to unify scientiﬁc conceptions of form with those found in
art and architecture at the level of structural science (Figure 3).31 From today’s
perspective, Kepes should be accorded a pivotal function: he marks the transition
from a Gestalt-theoretical conception of complexity to an aesthetic based on
technical-scientiﬁc structural principles. At least three developmental tendencies
are derivable from Kepes’s structural conception of complexity.
First of all, there are Kevin Lynch’s empirical experiments in the ﬁeld of
perception, which dealt with visual complexity in urban structures, converting
Kepes’s approaches into an interface joining architecture, urban planning, and the
cognitive sciences, which were then just on the point of becoming established.32
Second, there are the ‘generative aesthetics’ of early experimental computer
graphics, for example those of the German computer art pioneers Georg Nees
and Frieder Nake, which emerged as a new graphic trend.33
However, for current architectural production using information technology, a
third aspect harbours perhaps the greatest potential, located on the level of
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construction. The point of departure is what Frei Otto referred to as ‘natural con-
struction.’34 On the basis of the investigation of complex systems, he attempted
to constructively translate into architectural terms the economics governing the
processes of formal invention in nature. Processes of self-organization were
investigated from the perspective of their structural signiﬁcance for construction.
In this connection, Austrian-American architectural historian Eduard Sekler
refers to the distinction between structure and construction: ‘The real difference
between these two words is that ‘‘construction’’ carries a connotation of something
Figure 3. Visual materials accompanying Norbert Wiener’s essay ‘‘Pure
Patterns in a Natural World,’’ from the exhib. cat. The New Landscape in Art
and Science, ed. by Gyo¨rgy Kepes, Boston 1956
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put together consciously while ‘‘structure’’ refers to an ordered arrangement of
constituent parts in a much wider sense.’35 Both rhetorically and methodologically,
Otto attempted to overcome the purportedly intentional difference between con-
struction and structure delineated by Sekler. Structure and construction were to be
rendered equally controllable via the experimental transfer into architecture of the
economic criteria of natural processes of formal invention.
One of the most fruitful aspects for digital architectural production lies in
Otto’s attempt to effect a rapprochement between structure and construction. ‘I
examined natural, technical, and artistic objects, and in particular those processes
through which objects acquire their characteristic forms, their gestalts,’36
explains Otto. Through the application of complex systems devoted to the
structural determination of this ‘gestalt,’ Otto succeeds in discussing complexity
not only on an aesthetic level, but on an economic one as well. His point of
departure was the conviction that ‘if you begin the design process not from a
formal canon, but instead from the modelling of processes, then [it is] recom-
mended that [these] be formulated like the rules of the game.’37
Architectural production hence opened up for Otto a procedural-technical
interpretation of the complexity found in nature. Evident, however, with regard
to the potentialities of joining architecture and information technology is a
conceptual reservation concerning his methodology: both Otto’s concept of
natural construction and the design ideas resulting from it rest as a rule on the
structural principles of non-biological processes. Investigated, for example, are
the involved geometries of birds’ nests, but not the behaviour of ﬂocks of birds.
The multi-layered structures of anthills are analyzed, but not the behaviour
patterns of the ants themselves. Otto’s natural constructions are concerned, so to
speak, with the design outcomes and ﬁnished products of nonlinear processes of
formal invention.
Yet through growing research into new methods, such as of ‘artiﬁcial life’38 in
engineering-oriented, marginal areas of digital architectural production, it has
now also become possible to exploit the dynamic behaviour of biological sys-
tems. Emerging here as well is the decoupling of elements that remained uniﬁed
in Otto’s concept of ‘gestalt’: the structural process on the one hand, and the
forms it generates on the other. In other words: the separation of structure and
form. In the process, something has penetrated into technical thinking in archi-
tecture that derives unmistakably from the logic of information technology. The
technologization of nonlinear processes serves as the foundation for an inde-
pendent method of construction.39 Constructing with complex systems can be
regarded, then, as ‘an additional phase of the technical world’40 (see Figure 4).
In summary, it can be said that there are three lines of development of the
concept of complexity in architecture: a gestalt-psychological line, a cybernetic
line, and an algorithmic line. Of course, these lines are not mutually exclusive,
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but an advancing technologization of the concept of complexity cannot be
overlooked. With regard to the structural-scientiﬁc model of cybernetic thinking
and in connection with our initial question concerning the extension of the
complex of complexity, this development could be designated therefore as a
rapprochement with an ‘operationalization of the complex.’
To discuss this development from an architectural-theoretical perspective
requires more than simply designating individual buildings as trademarks of
Figure 4. Realized project ,,Swissbau 2005‘‘, Basel, Switzland: Based on
evolutionary optimization strategies in design and construction. The grid adjusts
itself during the growth process to various constructive requirements. The result is
a complex grown spherical structure. r Ludger Hovestadt, Chair for Computer-
Aided Architectural Design, ETH Zurich / Fabian Scheurer, designtoproduction
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the new science or of a new world picture. Equally unsatisfactory in exploring
the inﬂuence of complexity research on architecture is a restriction to aesthetic
criteria. Nonetheless, the buildings by Eisenman, Gehry, and Libeskind enum-
erated by Jencks can be seen with justice as artistic and architectural symbols
of complexity. Still, the development of the concept of complexity discussed
here demonstrates that Jencks never goes beyond the level of the visual. In other
words: for Jencks, complexity remains indebted to architectural form. The pre-
sent discussion by no means extends as far as conceptualizing the concept of
‘algorithmic complexity,’ for example. Information technologies function inde-
pendent of form; they operate rather at the structural level.
Discussions of architecture and complexity, hence, become a play with the
unrepresentable. Contemporary information technologies confront architectural-
theoretical discourses with developments that call for an expanded theoretical
instrumentarium. It remains unclear which architectural language might best be
used to approach the concept of complexity associated with information tech-
nologies. This question might serve as a point of departure for critical discussions
of the syntactic models of information technologies from the perspective of the
semantic requirements of architecture. How can we render the concept of com-
plexity that is operative in the information technologies comprehensible in
architecture? How can architectural meaning be generated and even shaped by a
technology whose operations are non-semantic in nature?
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